“Newspapers and the Law in Canada”
by Marc Lalonde, Cité Libre, 1966

Les journaux et la loi au Canada

Newspapers and the Law in Canada

par Marc LALONDE

by Marc LALONDE

Le professeur Marc Lalonde est le premier homme de loi qui, à notre connaissance, s’est penché sur ce sujet important et épineux.  Il l’a fait à la demande de l’Association des hebdos de langue française et de l’Union canadienne des journalistes de langue française.  Cité Libre entreprend aujourd’hui la publication de cet impressionnant document.  Nous le publierons en trois tranches, soit en avril, mai et juin.

Professor Marc Lalonde is the first jurist, as far as we know, to ponder this important and thorny subject.  He did so at the request of the Association of French-language Weeklies and of the Canadian Union of French-language Journalists.  Cité Libre today undertakes publication of this impressive document.  We are publishing it in three instalments, i.e., in April, May and June.

Nous remercions l’Association des hebdos et l’UCJLF qui nous ont facilité les choses dans les circonstances.

La Direction

We thank the Association of Weeklies and the UCJLF who facilitated things in the circumstances. 

The Management

Le droit public de tradition britannique, qui nous régit au Canada, constitue l’une des plus magnifiques créations juridiques de l’his­toire en vue de la garantie et de la protection des droits du citoyen.  Sousjacent à toute la théo­rie de ce droit se trouve le principe selon lequel il existe un certain nombre de droits fondamen­taux que le citoyen ne reçoit pas de l’Etat, mais qui lui appartiennent en propre; à moins d’une loi restreignant d’une façon précise l’exercice de ces droits, le citoyen jouit d’une liberté absolue.

The British tradition of public law, which governs us in Canada, constitutes one of the most magnificent legal creations in history with respect to guarantee and protection of the rights of the citizen.  Underlying the whole theory of this law is found the principle according to which there exist a certain number of fundamental rights that the citizen does not receive from the State, but which belong to him as his own; absent a law specifically restraining the exercise of these rights, the citizen enjoys absolute liberty.

Ces droits fondamentaux, nous avons tenté de les désigner, en 1960, dans la Déclaration canadienne des droits de l’homme et, il y a une vingtaine d’années, on les avait énumérés dans la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme adoptée par les Nations-Unies.

We attempted to specify these fundamental rights in 1960 in the Canadian Bill of Rights and, twenty years earlier, they were enumerated in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man adopted by the United Nations.

Parmi ces droits se trouve celui à la liberté de presse qui n’est elle-même qu’une facette de la liberté d’expression dont elle découle.  Les textes juridiques distinguent généralement ces deux libertés, par suite probablement du fait que la liberté de presse a été reconnue plus tardivement que la liberté d’expression et aussi par suite du fait qu’il existe une législation spécifique à la presse, plus abondante que celle qui régit la liberté d’expression généralement.  La liberté de la presse n’est cependant pas une institution ré­cente dans le droit public de tradition britannique puisque, dès le début du 18^e siècle, cette ex­pression était bien établie auprès des tribunaux.

Among these rights is found that of freedom of the press which itself is but an aspect of the freedom of expression from which it derives.  The legal texts generally distinguish these two freedoms, probably in light of the fact that freedom of the press was recognized later than freedom of expression and also in light of the fact that there exists a legislation specific to the press, more abundant than that which regulates freedom of expression generally.  Freedom of the press is nonetheless not a recent institution in the British public law tradition since, from the start of the 18th Century, this phrase was well established in the courts.

Conformément au principe selon lequel le citoyen peut revendiquer toute la liberté qui n’est pas spécifiquement enlevée ou restreinte par l’Etat, on peut exprimer de la façon suivante la situa­tion juridique canadienne en matière de liberté de presse et d’expression : la législation actuelle permet à quiconque de dire, écrire, et publier ce qui lui plaît; cependant, si une personne fait un mauvais usage de cette liberté, elle s’expose soit à un recours en dommages-intérêts au for civil, soit même à une amende ou à l’emprisonnement au for criminel.

In keeping with the principle according to which the citizen may claim any liberty that is not specifically removed or restrained by the State, the Canadian legal situation on the subject of freedom of the press and of expression can be expressed as follows:  current legislation allows anyone to say, write, and publish whatever he pleases; however, a person who abuses this freedom is exposed either to a civil recourse in damages, or even to a criminal fine or imprisonment.

Cette relation extrêmement étroite entre li­berté d’expression et liberté de presse a amené un grand juriste britannique, Lord Shaw, à résumer de la façon suivante la situation du jour­naliste par rapport à celle du citoyen en général (Arnold vs The King Emperor (1914) 30 TLR 462, à la p. 468)

This vital relationship between freedom of expression and freedom of the press led the great British jurist, Lord Shaw, to summarize the situation of the journalist versus that of the citizen in general as follows (Arnold vs The King Emperor (1914) 30 TLR 462, at page 468):

“The freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject, and to whatever length the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, but, apart from statute-law, his privilege is no other and no higher.  The responsibilities which attach to his power in the dissemination of printed matter may, and, in the case of a conscientious journalist, do make him more careful, but the range of his assertions, his criticisms or his comments is as wide as, and no wider than, that of any other subject.  No privilege attaches to his position.

“The freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject, and to whatever length the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, but, apart from statute-law, his privilege is no other and no higher.  The responsibilities which attach to his power in the dissemination of printed matter may, and, in the case of a conscientious journalist, do make him more careful, but the range of his assertions, his criticisms or his comments is as wide as, and no wider than, that of any other subject.  No privilege attaches to his position.

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Cette citation d’ailleurs a été constamment endossée par les tribunaux canadiens.

This citation moreover has been continually endorsed by Canadian courts.

Si la seule limite à la liberté d’expression est celle que l’on trouve dans la loi, il s’agit donc d’examiner quelles restrictions le législateur ca­nadien a voulu lui imposer.  Or, le régime fédéral canadien impose immédiatement la nécessité d’examiner qui, des provinces, ou de l’Etat cen­tral,a juridiction en cette matière.

If the sole limit to freedom of expression is that found in the law, it is then a question of examining what restrictions the Canadian legislator has set out to impose.  Now, the Canadian federal regime immediately imposes the necessity of examining which, the provinces or the central Government, has jurisdiction in this matter.

L’Acte de l’Amérique du Nord Britannique de 1867 ne contient aucune disposition concer­nant la liberté d’expression et la liberté de presse; en fait, cette loi ne contient aucune disposition concernant ce que l’on appelle les libertés fonda­mentales du citoyen.  Cependant, le préambule contient une disposition déclarant que le Canada sera doté d’une constitution semblable en prin­cipe à celle du Royaume-Uni; ceci a permis d’im­porter dans le régime constitutionnel canadien les grands documents constitutionnels britanni­ques que sont la Grande Charte, le Bill of Rights, etc.

The British North America Act of 1867 contains no provision regarding freedom of expression and freedom of the press; in fact, this law contains no provision regarding what are called the fundamental freedoms of the citizen.  However, the preamble contains a provision declaring that Canada is to be endowed with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom; which has allowed the great British constitutional documents, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, etc., to be imported into the Canadian constitutional regime.

L’absence de dispositions expresses à cet égard dans l’Acte de l’Amérique du Nord Bri­tannique aurait pu amener les juristes canadiens à assimiler les libertés fondamentales aux droits civils ordinaires et à les faire tomber sous la juridiction des provinces en vertu du paragraphe 13 de l’Article 92, conférant à celles-ci juridiction en matière de propriété et de droits civils; ainsi, par le jeu de l’Article 92, les provinces auraient pu légiférer à leur guise en matière de liberté de presse et d’expression.

The absence of express provisions to this effect in the British North America Act might have led Canadian jurists to assimilate fundamental freedoms to ordinary civil rights and have them fall under the jurisdiction of the provinces in virtue of paragraph 13 of Section 92, conferring jurisdiction on the latter with respect to property and civil rights; thus, by the play of Section 92, the provinces might have legislated as they wished in respect to freedom of the press and of expression.

Nos tribunaux ont cependant refusé de re­connaître ces libertés comme de simples droits civils ordinaires mais plutôt comme des droits publics fondamentaux; à cet égard, la petite clause apparemment innoffensive du préambule de l’Acte de 1867 a été d’une grande utilité.  Depuis l’af­faire de la législation albertaine en matière de presse, en 1938, il s’agit d’une position que nos tribunaux ont constamment maintenue.

Our courts have however refused to recognize these freedoms simply as ordinary civil rights but rather as fundamental public rights; to this end, the little apparently innocuous clause of the preamble of the Act of 1867 has been of great utility.  Since the matter of the Alberta Press Case in 1938, it has been a position that our courts have continually maintained.

Lors de son arrivée au pouvoir en Albcrta, le Premier Ministre Aberhart avait décidé de mettre en pratique sans délai la théorie du Crédit Social.  A cette fin, il avait fait adopter divers statuts concernant les affaires bancaires et le taux d’intérêt.  En outre, il avait fait adopter une loi intitulée « The Accurate News and Information Act ».  En vertu de cette loi, une Régie de la Presse était constituée et celle-ci était dotée de pouvoirs extrêmement considérables.  C’est ainsi que la Régie pouvait obliger un journal à publier à ses propres frais un article expliquant toute politique décidée par le gouvernement et qui, selon la Régie, n’aurait pas fait le sujet d’un commentaire équitable de la part de ce journal.

On coming to power in Alberta, Premier Aberhart decided to put the theory of Social Credit into practice without delay.  To this end, he had various statutes adopted on banking matters and interest rates.  In addition, he had a law adopted entitled “The Accurate News and Information Act“.  In virtue of this law, a Press Board was constituted and equipped with quite wide powers.  Thus the Board could oblige a newspaper to publish at its own expense an article explaining any policy decided by the government and which, according to the Board, had not been the subject of fair commentary on the part of this newspaper.

En outre, la Régie pouvait exiger que tout jour­nal révèle, à 24 heures d’avis, les sources d’infor­mations de tout article publié dans ce journal.  Au cas où un journal ne se conformerait pas à la loi, le Lieutenant-gouverneur en conseil, sur recommandation du président de la Régie, pou­vait interdire ou suspendre la publication de ce journal.  La Cour Suprême du Canada fut una­nime à déclarer cette loi ultra vires  de la pro­vince.  Le juge en chef Duff déclarait en parti­culier :

In addition, the Board could require any newspaper to reveal, with 24 hours’ notice, the sources of information of any article published in this newspaper.  In the case where a newspaper did not conform to the law, the Lieutenant-governor in Council, on recommendation of the President of the Board, could prohibit or suspend publication of this newspaper.  The Supreme Court of Canada was unanimous in declaring this law ultra vires of the province.  Chief Justice Duff declared in particular:

« Any attempt to abrogate this right of public debate or to suppress the traditional forms of the exercise of the right (in public meeting and through the press) would, in our opinion, be incompetent to the legislatures of the provinces, or to the legislatures of any one of the provinces, as repugnant to the provi­sions of the British North America Act, by which, the Parliament of Canada is establish­ed as the legislative organ of the people of Canada under the Crown, and Dominion Le­gislation enacted pursuant to the legislative authority given by those provisions. » (1938 S.C.R. 100, à la p. 134)

« Any attempt to abrogate this right of public debate or to suppress the traditional forms of the exercise of the right (in public meeting and through the press) would, in our opinion, be incompetent to the legislatures of the provinces, or to the legislatures of any one of the provinces, as repugnant to the provi­sions of the British North America Act, by which, the Parliament of Canada is establish­ed as the legislative organ of the people of Canada under the Crown, and Dominion Le­gislation enacted pursuant to the legislative authority given by those provisions. » (1938 S.C.R. 100, at page 134)

Le juge Cannon ajoutait :

Judge Cannon added:

« Under the British System, which is ours, no political party can erect a prohibitory barrier to prevent the electors from getting information concerning the policy of the gov­ernment.  Freedom of discussion is essential to enlighten public opinion in a democratic State; it cannot be curtailed without affecting the rights of the people to be informed through sources independent of the government con­cerning matters of public interest.  There must be untramelled publication of the news and political opinions of the political parties con­tending for ascendency.  Democracy cannot be maintained without its foundation:  free throughout the nation of all matters affecting the State within the limits set by the criminal code and the common law.  The Federal Parliament is the sole authority to curtail, if deemed expedient and in the public interest, the freedom of the press in discussing public affairs and the equal rights in that respect of all citizens throughout the Dominion.  These subjects were matters of criminal law before Confederation [sic] have been recognized by

« Under the British System, which is ours, no political party can erect a prohibitory barrier to prevent the electors from getting information concerning the policy of the gov­ernment.  Freedom of discussion is essential to enlighten public opinion in a democratic State; it cannot be curtailed without affecting the rights of the people to be informed through sources independent of the government con­cerning matters of public interest.  There must be untramelled publication of the news and political opinions of the political parties con­tending for ascendency.  Democracy cannot be maintained without its foundation:  free throughout the nation of all matters affecting the State within the limits set by the criminal code and the common law.  The Federal Parliament is the sole authority to curtail, if deemed expedient and in the public interest, the freedom of the press in discussing public affairs and the equal rights in that respect of all citizens throughout the Dominion.  These subjects were matters of criminal law before Confederation [sic] have been recognized by

Moreover, citizens outside of Alberta have a vital interest in having full information and comment, favourable and unfavourable, regarding the policy of the Alberta Govern­ment and concerning events in that Province which would, in the ordinary course, be the subject of Alberta newspapers’ news items and articles. »

(1938, S.C.U., 100, aux p. 145 et 146)

Moreover, citizens outside of Alberta have a vital interest in having full information and comment, favourable and unfavourable, regarding the policy of the Alberta Govern­ment and concerning events in that Province which would, in the ordinary course, be the subject of Alberta newspapers’ news items and articles. »

(1938, S.C.U., 100, at pages 145 and 146)

On doit noter que le juge Cannon est le seul membre de la Cour Suprême, à l’époque, à dé­clarer aussi catégoriquement que la restriction de la liberté de presse appartient à l’autorité fédérale.  Les autres membres du tribunal se sont limités à déclarer que le Parlement fédéral avait sûrement juridiction pour légiférer pour la pro­tection de cette liberté.  Mais la question de­meurait de savoir si l’autorité fédérale pouvait restreindre ou même abroger cette liberté et c’est ce que des causes ultérieures allaient étudier.

It should be noted that Judge Cannon was the only member of the Supreme Court, at that time, to declare so categorically that restriction of freedom of the press belongs to the federal authority.  The other members of the court confined themselves to declaring that the federal Parliament certainly had jurisdiction to legislate to protect this freedom.  But the question remained of knowing if the federal authority could restrain or even abrogate this freedom and this is what the great future cases would examine.

L’affaire Saumur, en 1953, allait souligner les difficultés de la question.  Dans cette affaire, on débattait la validité d’un règlement de la ville de Québec interdisant la distribution dans les rues de tous livres, brochures, circulaires ou fas­cicules quelconques, sans avoir obtenu au préala­ble la permission écrite du chef de police.  Saumur avait attaqué la validité de ce règlement, en allé­guant qu’il avait été adopté expressément pour empêcher les activités évangéliques des Témoins de Jéhova dans la ville de Québec.  La Cour Suprême décida que ce règlement n’allait pas jusqu’à interdire le droit pour les Témoins de Jéhova de distribuer dans les rues de Québec les écrits publiés par cette confession religieuse et que, de toute façon, les officiers de la ville de Québec n’avaient aucun droit en vertu de ce règlement de prendre des mesures pour empê­cher telle distribution.  Cette affaire touche à la fois à la liberté religieuse et à la liberté d’ex­pression et de presse.  On voit, dans ce cas, combien sont étroitement reliées toutes les li­bertés fondamentales du citoyen et qu’une atteinte à l’une d’elles peut facilement mettre en jeu l’existence des autres.  Mais cette cause est particulièrement intéressante en rapport avec les opinions des juges concernant la liberté de presse et la liberté de religion.  Les juges Rinfret et Taschereau déclarèrent que, selon eux, la liberté de religion faisait partie des droits civils à l’inté­rieur de la province et, en tant que telle, tombait sous la juridiction de la province.  Le juge Kerwin exprima son désaccord avec les opinions émises par les juges Duff et Cannon dans l’affaire de la presse d’Alberta et déclara que la liberté de la religion ainsi que la liberté de la presse devaient être classées, selon lui, parmi les droits civils à l’intérieur d’une province et comme tels étaient de juridiction provinciale.  Quant aux juges Cartwright et Fauteux, ils déclarèrent que les provinces, comme l’état fédéral, chacun selon divers aspects, avaient juridiction l’un et l’autre en matière de liberté de presse et de religion.  Enfin, les juges Rand, Kellock, Locke ainsi que Estey se déclarèrent d’accord avec les opinions émises dans l’affaire d’Alberta.  A mon avis, une identification trop poussée de la liberté de religion et de la liberté de presse a provoqué une certaine confusion dans cette affaire.  Il est en effet impossible de rattacher la liberté de religion au préambule de l’Acte de l’Amérique du Nord ainsi qu’aux institutions parlementaires, de la même façon que le juge Duff l’avait fait pour la liberté de presse, en 1938.

The Saumur affair in 1953 would underscore the difficulties of the question.  In this case, the validity of a municipal bylaw of the City of Quebec was at issue forbidding distribution of all books, brochures, circulars or pamphlets whatever in the streets without the prior written permission of the chief of police.  Saumur had attacked the validity of this bylaw, alleging that it had been adopted expressly to impede the evangelical activities of the Jehova’s Witnesses in the City of Quebec.  The Supreme Court decided that this bylaw did not go so far as to disallow the rights of the Jehova’s Witnesses to distribute in the streets of Quebec the published texts of this religious confession and that, in any case, the officers of the City of Quebec had no right in virtue of this bylaw to take steps to prevent such distribution.  This matter touches religious liberty and freedom of expression and of the press at the same time.  We see, in this case, how closely related are all the fundamental freedoms of the citizen and that an infringement of one of them may easily call into play the existence of the others.  But this case is particularly interesting with respect to the opinions of the judges concerning freedom of the press and freedom of religion.  Judges Rinfret and Taschereau declared that, in their view, freedom of religion was a part of civil rights within the province and, as such, fell under provincial jurisdiction.  Judge Kerwin expressed his disagreement with the opinions issued by Judges Duff and Cannon in the Alberta Press affair, and decided that freedom of religion as well as freedom of the press had to be classified, in his view, among civil rights within a province and as such were under provincial jurisdiction.  As for Judges Cartwright and Fauteux, they declared that the provinces, like the federal state, each according to various aspects, both had jurisdiction on the subjects of freedom of the press and of religion.  Lastly, Judges Rand, Kellock, Locke and Estey announced their agreement with the opinions issued in the Alberta Press affair.  In my view, an excessive identification of freedom of religion and freedom of the press provoked some confusion in this affair.  It is in effect impossible to attach freedom of religion to the preamble of the British North America Act and thus to parliamentary institutions, in the same way that Judge Duff had done for freedom of the press in 1938.

La question de la liberté de presse fut à nou­veau soulevée, en 1956, dans l’affaire de Dionne vs la Cour Municipale de Montréal (1956, 3 D.L.R., 727).  Un règlement de Montréal inter­dirait la distribution gratuite de publications dans les rues de la Ville, sauf sur permission du Con­seil Exécutif et sur recommandation du Directeur de la Police.  Dionne qui était un candidat com­muniste à Montréal, lors d’une élection fédérale, contesta la validité du règlement et celui-ci fut déclaré invalide en Cour Supérieure de Montréal, en ce qui concernait la distribution des tracts élec­toraux lors des élections fédérales.  Le juge déclara que cela relevait de l’exclusive compétence fédérale, étant donné qu’il s’agissait d’une élection fédérale.  En outre, le juge en chef Scott y déclara son accord avec l’opinion du Juge Duff dans l’affaire de presse d’Alberta.

The question of freedom of the press was raised anew in 1956 in the matter of Dionne vs la Cour Municipale de Montréal (1956, 3 D.L.R., 727).  A Montreal bylaw forbade the free distribution of publications in the streets of the City, except with permission of the Executive Council and on recommendation of the Director of Police.  Dionne, who had been a communist candidate in Montreal, during a federal election, contested the validity of the bylaw and it was declared void in Superior Court in Montreal with respect to the distribution of electoral tracts during federal elections.  The judge declared that this fell exclusively under federal competency, given that it was a federal election.  In addition, Chief justice Scott stated his agreement with the opinion of Judge Duff in the Alberta Press affair.

Enfin, l’affaire Switzrnan vs Elbling et le Procureur général de la province de Québec (1957, S.C.R., 285) allait consolider le statut de la liberté de presse au Canada.  Dans cette affaire, on attaquait la « loi protégeant la pro­vince contre la propagande communiste », ou, communément appelée, la loi du cadenas.  La Cour Suprême du Canada, par une majorité de huit juges contre un seul, renversait la décision majoritaire de la Cour d’Appel de la province de Québec ainsi que de la Cour Supérieure et déclarait cette loi ultra vires des pouvoirs de la province.  Cette loi déclarait en particulier qu’il était illégal de louer ou de permettre l’usage d’une propriété quelconque dans la province pour fins de propagande communiste de quelque façon que ce soit.  La loi déclarait, en outre, qu’il était illégal d’imprimer et de publier et de distribuer de quelque façon que ce soit dans la province tout document propageant ou tendant à propager le communisme ou le bolchevisme.  Cinq des juges de la Cour Suprême déclarèrent que cette loi constituait une législation de droit criminel qui, en vertu du paragraphe 27 de [l’Acte de] l’Amérique du Nord Britannique, était de la compétence exclusive du Parlement du Canada.  Trois autres juges déclarèrent que cette loi constituait une

Finally, the matter of Switzman vs Elbling and the Attorney General of the province of Quebec (1957, S.C.R., 285) would consolidate the status of freedom of the press in Canada.  In this case, the attack was on the “law protecting the province against communist propaganda”, or, commonly called, the Padlock Law.  The Supreme Court of Canada, by a majority of eight judges to one, reversed the majority decision of the Court of Appeal of the province of Quebec as well as of the Superior Court and declared this law ultra vires of the powers of the province.  This law stated in particular that it was illegal to rent or allow the use of an any property in the province in any manner whatsoever for the purpose of communist propaganda.  The law declared, moreover, that it was illegal to print and publish and distribute by any manner whatsoever in the province any document propagating or tending to propagate Communism or Bolshevism.  Five of the judges of the Supreme Court declared that this law constituted criminal-law legislation which, according to Section 27 of the British North America Act, belonged to the exclusive competence of the Parliament of Canada.  Three other judges declared that this law constituted an

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interférence injustifiable avec la liberté d’expres­sion qui était essentielle à la forme démocratique de gouvernement établie au Canada.  Quant au juge Taschereau, il fut le seul à soutenir que cette loi n’était pas une loi en matière criminelle, mais qu’elle avait pour seul objet de supprimer les conditions favorisant le développement du crime et de contrôler les propriétés situées dans la province de façon à protéger la société contre les usages illégaux qui pourraient en être faits.

unjustifiable interference with freedom of expression which was essential to the democratic form of government established in Canada.  As for Judge Taschereau, he was the only one to assert that this law was not a criminal law, but that it had for its sole object to suppress conditions favoring the development of crime and to controle properties located in the province in such a way as to protect society against the illegal uses that might be made of them.

Cette cause est tout d’abord importante en ceci qu’elle établit fermement que le pouvoir de légiférer directement en matière de liberté de presse découle d’abord et avant tout de la juri­diction en matière de droit criminel.  Mais cette cause va encore plus loin.  Le juge Rand déclara tout d’abord que la liberté d’expression faisait partie intégrante du fonctionnement d’un régime démocratique.  Il déclara en particulier, aux pa­ges 306 et 307 :

This case is first of all important in that it firmly established that the power to legislate directly on the subject of freedom of the press derives first and above all from the criminal law jurisdiction.  But this case will go even further.  Judge Rand declared first of all that freedom of expression is an integral part of the functioning of a democratic regime.  He stated in particular, at pages 306 and 307:

« Whatever the deficiencies in its working, Canadian Government is in substance the will of the majority expressed directly or indirectly through popular assemblies.  This means ultimately government by the free public opinion of an open society, the effectiveness of which, as events have not infrequently demonstrated, is undoubted.

« Whatever the deficiencies in its working, Canadian Government is in substance the will of the majority expressed directly or indirectly through popular assemblies.  This means ultimately government by the free public opinion of an open society, the effectiveness of which, as events have not infrequently demonstrated, is undoubted.

But public opinion, in order to meet such responsibility, demands the condition of a virtually unob[s]tructed access to and diffusion of ideas.  Parliamentary government postulates a capacity in men, acting freely and under self-restraints, to govern themselves; and that advance is best served in the degree achieved of individual liberation from subjective as well as objective shackles.  Under that govern­ment, the freedom of discussion in Canada, as a subject matter of legislation, has a unity of interest and significance extending equally to every part of the Dominion.  With such dimensions, it is ipso facto excluded from head 16 as a local matter.

But public opinion, in order to meet such responsibility, demands the condition of a virtually unob[s]tructed access to and diffusion of ideas.  Parliamentary government postulates a capacity in men, acting freely and under self-restraints, to govern themselves; and that advance is best served in the degree achieved of individual liberation from subjective as well as objective shackles.  Under that govern­ment, the freedom of discussion in Canada, as a subject matter of legislation, has a unity of interest and significance extending equally to every part of the Dominion.  With such dimensions, it is ipso facto excluded from head 16 as a local matter.

This constitutional fact is the political ex­pression of the primary condition of social life, thought and its communication by lan­guage.  Liberty in this is little less vital to man’s mind and spirit than breathing is to his physical existence.  As such an inherence in the individual, it is embodied in his status of citizenship. (…)

This constitutional fact is the political ex­pression of the primary condition of social life, thought and its communication by lan­guage.  Liberty in this is little less vital to man’s mind and spirit than breathing is to his physical existence.  As such an inherence in the individual, it is embodied in his status of citizenship. (…)

Prohibition of any part of this activity as an evil would be within the scope of criminal law (…).  Bearing in mind that the endow­ment of parliamentary institution[s] is one and entire for the Dominion, that Legislatures and Parliament are permanent features of our constitutional structure, and that the body of discussion is indivisible, apart from the incidence of criminal law and civil rights, and incidental effects of legislation in relation to other matters, the degree and nature of its regulation must await future consideration, for the purposes here it is sufficient to say that it is not a matter within the regulation of a Province. »

Prohibition of any part of this activity as an evil would be within the scope of criminal law (…).  Bearing in mind that the endow­ment of parliamentary institution[s] is one and entire for the Dominion, that Legislatures and Parliament are permanent features of our constitutional structure, and that the body of discussion is indivisible, apart from the incidence of criminal law and civil rights, and incidental effects of legislation in relation to other matters, the degree and nature of its regulation must await future consideration, for the purposes here it is sufficient to say that it is not a matter within the regulation of a Province. »

Le juge Abbott alla encore plus loin en dé­clarant, à la page 328 :

Judge Abbott went even further in stating at page 328: